主题：Strategic Wholesale Price and Order Policy Under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain
王新辉：南洋理工新开户送彩金南洋商学院博士后。西南民族新开户送彩金信息与信息管理系副教授，硕导，中国系统工程学会会员，2017年中国管理科学最具影响力论文奖获得者。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、教育部人文社科项目、中央高校项目等各类纵向课题5项。在Computers & Industrial Engineering、Applied Mathematical Modelling、中国管理科学、管理工程学报等期刊发表论文20余篇。研究兴趣：博弈论、供应链机制设计。
This paper investigates strategic wholesale price and order policy for supply chain firms under bilateral information updating. Specifically, we consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The former incurs uncertain production cost and the latter faces uncertain demand. They commit an initial wholesale price and an initial minimum order quantity respectively before production starts. After more information is acquired, the manufacturer may change her wholesale price based on updated production cost, and the retailer may place additional orders based on updated market outlook. We find that under bilateral information updating, if the updated production cost is lower (higher) than before, the wholesale price may not be decreased (increased). Demand information updating is always beneficial to the retailer, but not always to the manufacturer. The minimum order quantity commitment is beneficial to the manufacturer, especially to those who incur a high production cost. Further, a good market outlook increases the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the entire supply chain. The profit of the manufacturer who has a relatively high production cost increases with information accuracy, whereas the retailer’s profit increases (decreases) with information accuracy when the market outlook is good (bad). Last, with our designed contract, the effect of double marginalization can be reduced to some extent.